ICRP Publication 111
Application of the Commission's Recommendations to the Protection of People Living in Long-term Contaminated Areas after a Nuclear Accident or a Radiation Emergency
Recommended citation
ICRP, 2009. Application of the Commission's Recommendations to the Protection of People Living in Long-term Contaminated Areas After a Nuclear Accident or a Radiation Emergency. ICRP Publication 111. Ann. ICRP 39 (3).
Authors on behalf of ICRP
J. Lochard, I. Bogdevitch, E. Gallego, P. Hedemann-Jensen, A. McEwan, A. Nisbet, A. Oudiz, T. Schneider, P. Strand, Z. Carr, A. Janssens, T. Lazo
Abstract - In this report, the Commission provides guidance for the protection of people living in long-term contaminated areas resulting from either a nuclear accident or a radiation emergency. The report considers the effects of such events on the affected population. This includes the pathways of human exposure, the types of exposed populations, and the characteristics of exposures. Although the focus is on radiation protection considerations, the report also recognises the complexity of post-accident situations, which cannot be managed without addressing all the affected domains of daily life, i.e. environmental, health, economic, social, psychological, cultural, ethical, political, etc. The report explains how the 2007 Recommendations apply to this type of existing exposure situation, including consideration of the justification and optimisation of protection strategies, and the introduction and application of a reference level to drive the optimisation process. The report also considers practical aspects of the implementation of protection strategies, both by authorities and the affected population. It emphasises the effectiveness of directly involving the affected population and local professionals in the management of the situation, and the responsibility of authorities at both national and local levels to create the conditions and provide the means favouring the involvement and empowerment of the population. The role of radiation monitoring, health surveillance, and the management of contaminated foodstuffs and other commodities is described in this perspective. The Annex summarises past experience of long term contaminated areas resulting from radiation emergencies and nuclear accidents, including radiological criteria followed in carrying out remediation measures.
© 2009 ICRP Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Post-accident; Rehabilitation; Optimisation; Reference level; Stakeholder involvement; Radiation monitoring; Health surveillance; Contaminated foodstuffs.
Key Points: Not included in this publication
Executive Summary
(a) The present report provides guidance on the application of the Commission’s Recommendations for the protection of people living in long-term contaminated areas resulting from either a nuclear accident or a radiation emergency. This post accident rehabilitation situation is considered by the Commission as an ‘existing exposure situation’.
(b) The following recommendations are the first to deal with the management of existing exposure situations since publication of the 2007 Recommendations (ICRP, 2007). They complement those made in Publication 82 (ICRP, 2000), and further develop the role of stakeholders, introduced for the first time by the Commission in this publication. They also take into account the evolution introduced by the 2007 Recommendations from the previous process-based approach of practices and interventions to an approach based on the characteristics of radiation exposure situations. They particularly emphasise the new approach of the Commission, which reinforces the principle of optimisation of protection to be applied in a similar way to all exposure situations with restrictions on individual doses.
(c) Although developed for managing a specific category of existing exposure situation, many recommendations developed in this report are broadly applicable with the necessary adaptations to other existing exposure situations like, for example, radon in dwellings and workplaces, naturally occurring radioactive material, or contaminated sites resulting from past nuclear and industrial activities. This particularly concerns the use of reference levels to plan protection strategies, the role of self-help protective actions complementing the protective actions implemented by authorities, and the accompanying measures to inform the affected individuals.
(d) The transition from an emergency exposure situation to an existing exposure situation is characterised by a change in management, from strategies mainly driven by urgency, with potentially high levels of exposure and predominantly central decisions, to more decentralised strategies aiming to improve living conditions and reduce exposure to as low as reasonably achievable given the circumstances. The decision to allow people who wish to live in contaminated areas to do so is taken by the authorities, and this indicates the beginning of the post-accident rehabilitation phase. Implicit with this decision is the ability to provide people with protection against the potential health consequences of the radiation, and sustainable living conditions, including respectable lifestyles and livelihoods.
(e) Past experience of existing exposure situations resulting from a nuclear accident or a radiological emergency has revealed that all dimensions of the daily life of the inhabitants within the contaminated areas, as well as the social and economic activities, are affected. These are complex situations which cannot be managed with radiation protection considerations alone, and must address all relevant dimensions such as health, environmental, economic, social, psychological, cultural, ethical, political, etc.
(f) In most existing exposure situations affecting the living place of the population, the level of exposure is mainly driven by individual behaviour and is difficult to control at the source. This generally results in a very heterogeneous distribution of exposures, which call for an individual approach for control of the situation. As a consequence, the use of the ‘average individual’ is not appropriate for the management of exposure in a contaminated area.
(g) Living or working in contaminated areas is considered to represent an existing exposure situation. For such situations, the fundamental protection principles include the justification of implementing protection strategies, and the optimisation of the protection achieved by these strategies. Reference levels are used during the optimisation process to plan protection strategies that would result in estimated residual doses lower than these levels. Dose limits do not apply because existing exposure situations cannot be managed in an a priori fashion.
(h) Protection strategies are made up of a series of protective actions directed at the relevant exposure pathways. The justification and optimisation of protection strategies are an evolution from previous Recommendations, which were focused on justification and optimisation of individual protection measures.
(i) In the case of an existing exposure situation following an emergency exposure situation, justification applies initially to the fundamental decision to be taken by the authorities at the end of the emergency exposure situation to allow people to live permanently in long-term contaminated areas. Such a decision may be accompanied by the setting of a radiation protection criterion above which it is mandatory to relocate the population, and below which inhabitants are allowed to stay subject to certain conditions. Several areas may be defined with relevant conditions according to a graded approach. Secondly, the justification principle applies at the level of decision related to the definition of the protection strategies to be implemented to maintain and possibly improve the radiological situation resulting from the emergency phase.
(j) The responsibility for ensuring an overall benefit to society as well as to individuals when populations are allowed to stay in contaminated areas lies with governments or national authorities. Worldwide experience following nuclear and non-nuclear accidents shows that neither nations nor individuals are very willing to leave affected areas. In general, while authorities may require individuals to leave the affected areas for health reasons in case of excessive residual levels of exposure, wherever possible, they will aim to rehabilitate these areas to allow further human activities.
(k) The principle of optimisation of protection with a restriction on individual dose is central to the system of protection recommended by the Commission for existing exposure situations. Due to its judgemental nature, there is a strong need for transparency of the process. This transparency assumes that all relevant information is provided to the involved parties, and that the traceability of the decision-making process is documented properly, aiming for an informed decision.
(l) Protection strategies have to be prepared by authorities as part of national planning arrangements. These plans should take into account self-help protective actions, including the conditions to allow such actions to be undertaken by the inhabitants, and their results in terms of prospective dose reduction. Although it is difficult to ask the population to plan in advance for these actions, the Commission recommends authorities to involve key representative stakeholders to participate in the preparation of these plans.
(m) As in most cases in long-term contaminated areas, the level of exposure is driven by individual behaviour; the authorities should facilitate processes to allow inhabitants to define, optimise, and apply their own protective actions if required. A positive aspect is that individuals regain control of their own situation. However, self-help protective actions may be disturbing and their implementation supposes that affected individuals are fully aware of the situation and well informed. It is the government’s responsibility to provide good guidance and to provide the means to implement it. Hence the government, or the responsible authority, will need to constantly evaluate the effectiveness of the protection strategy in place, including protective actions carried out at local or individual levels, in order to provide adequate support on how to further improve the situation.
(n) The Commission recommends that reference levels, set in terms of individual annual effective residual dose (mSv/year), should be used in conjunction with the planning and implementation of the optimisation process for exposures in existing exposure situations. The objective is to implement optimised protection strategies, or a progressive range of such strategies, which aim to reduce individual doses below the reference level. During the planning stage, the optimisation process should result in estimated residual doses that are below the reference level. During implementation of the optimisation process, particular attention should be given to reduce individual exposures that may remain above the reference level. However, exposures below the reference level should not be ignored; they should also be assessed to ascertain whether protection is optimised or further protective actions are needed.
(o) The reference level for the optimisation of protection of people living in contaminated areas should be selected in the lower part of the 1–20 mSv/year band recommended in Publication 103 (ICRP, 2007) for the management of this category of exposure situations. Past experience has demonstrated that a typical value used for constraining the optimisation process in long-term post-accident situations is 1 mSv/year. National authorities may take into account the prevailing circumstances, and also take advantage of the timing of the overall rehabilitation programme to adopt intermediate reference levels to improve the situation progressively.
(p) Reference levels are used both prospectively, for planning of protection strategies (as well as, if necessary, defining derived reference levels for the implementation of some specific protective actions such as, for instance, trade of foodstuffs), and retrospectively as a benchmark for judging the effectiveness of implemented protection strategies.
(q) The fact that exposures have been reduced below the reference level is not a sufficient condition to discontinue protective actions as long as there is room to reduce exposures further in conformity with the optimisation process. The continuation of such actions would probably be a prime mechanism to maintain exposures close or similar to those in normal situations as recommended by the Commission.
(r) The management of an existing exposure situation following a nuclear accident or a radiological emergency relies on the implementation of a more or less complex rehabilitation programme coping with numerous dimensions (social, economic, health, environmental, etc.) according to the level of contamination and its space and time distribution. The implementation of protection strategies is a dynamic process which changes with the evolution of the radiological situation.
(s) It is the responsibility of the authorities, particularly at the regulatory level, to establish the conditions and to implement the means to allow effective engagement of the affected population in the protection strategies and more globally in the rehabilitation programme. Past experience of the management of contaminated areas has demonstrated that the involvement of local professionals and inhabitants in the implementation of protection strategies is important for sustainability of the rehabilitation programme. Mechanisms for engaging with stakeholders are driven by national and cultural characteristics, and should be adapted to the circumstances.
(t) The priority of protection strategies implemented by authorities is to protect people with the highest exposures, and in parallel to reduce all individual exposures associated with the event to as low as reasonably achievable. This implies assessment of the dose distribution, comparison of all doses with the reference level, and subsequent optimisation of protection. Typical strategies to be implemented by the authorities in a post-accident situation are clean-up of buildings, remediation of soils and vegetation, changes in animal husbandry, monitoring of the environment and produce, provision of clean foodstuffs, managing of waste (resulting from clean-up or from unmarketable contaminated goods), provision of information, guidance, instruction and equipment (e.g. for measurements), health surveillance, education of children, information for particular exposed groups and the public at large, etc. Experience has shown that the dissemination of a ‘practical radiological protection culture’ within all segments of the population, and especially within professionals in charge of the public health and education, is key to the success of protection strategies in the long term.
(u) Typical actions taken by the inhabitants in long-term contaminated areas, called ‘self-help protective actions’ by the Commission, are those aiming at the characterisation of their own radiological situation, notably their external and internal exposure. These mainly consist of monitoring the radiological quality of their direct environment (ambient dose rates in living areas and contamination of foodstuffs), their own external and internal exposure, and the exposure of the people for whom they have responsibility (e.g. children, elderly), and in adapting their way of life accordingly to reduce their exposure. Authorities should facilitate the setting-up of local forums involving representatives of the affected population and relevant experts (e.g. health, radiation protection, agriculture authorities, etc.). These forums will allow gathering and sharing of information, and favour common assessment of the effectiveness of strategies driven by the populations and the authorities.
(v) In recent years, stakeholder engagement has moved steadily to the forefront of policy decisions. Such engagement is considered by the Commission as key to the development and implementation of radiological protection strategies for most existing exposure situations. The control of radon in dwellings is another typical example. As experience in stakeholder engagement has grown, it has been possible to use many of the lessons learned as a basis for the development of best practice among the radiation protection community. Processes and tools are becoming established that can be generally applied to situations where the views and input of stakeholders are instrumental in improving the quality of protection.
(w) In the case of an existing exposure situation, the Commission recommends that the individuals concerned should receive general information on the exposure situation and the means of reducing their doses. In situations where individual lifestyles are key drivers of the exposure, individual monitoring is an important requirement, coupled with an information programme. Furthermore, given the uncertainties concerning future potential health effects of the exposures received by the population since the emergency phase, it is the responsibility of the authorities to implement a radiation and health surveillance programme.
(x) From the perspective of assessing the evolution of the exposure situation and the effectiveness of the protection strategies, the Commission recommends that a monitoring record system should be established under the responsibility of the relevant authorities. Such records are particularly important for determining potential groups at risk, in conjunction with health surveillance. Furthermore, to allow effective long-term health surveillance of the affected population, the Commission also recommends that health registries should be established for the population residing in the contaminated areas.
(y) The management of contaminated foodstuffs and other commodities produced in areas affected by a nuclear accident or a radiation emergency presents a particularly difficult problem because of issues of market acceptance: Furthermore, maintaining long-term restrictions on the production and consumption of foodstuffs may affect the sustainable development of the contaminated areas, and therefore call for appropriate implementation of the optimisation principle. Reconciling the interests of local farmers, producers, and the local population with those of consumers and the food distribution sector from outside the contaminated territory has to be considered carefully.
(z) The Commission considers that, despite the socio-economic complexity of the management of contaminated foodstuffs, in view of the interests of different stakeholders, protection strategies should be developed to meet the established reference level and optimised at all levels where it is possible to intervene: production, distribution, processing, as well as measures taken for informing consumers and allowing them to make appropriate choices. Derived reference levels expressed in Bq/kg or Bq/L play an important role in this process, in particular for the placing of foodstuffs on the market.
(aa) Commodities other than foodstuffs may be contaminated following a nuclear accident or other radiological emergency. These could include agricultural products such as wood, paper, and oil, or other products recycled from contaminated materials such as scrap metal. The objective again is to reduce exposure to as low as reasonably achievable, taking into account social and economic factors.
(bb) Past experience of long-term contaminated areas resulting from either nuclear tests (Bikini, Maralinga), nuclear accidents (Kyshtym, Palomares, Chernobyl), or a radiological source accident (Goiânia) illustrates the potential importance of ingestion of contaminated foodstuffs several decades after the event at the source of the problems when large rural areas are affected. Management of these foodstuffs to protect the local population against chronic internal exposure and to maintain the viability of local productions is essential. When urban and semi-urban environments are affected, irradiation and inhalation may remain significant exposure pathways for a long period of time. As far as the setting of reference levels for existing exposure situations resulting from nuclear accidents and radiation emergencies is concerned, past experience shows that typical dose values selected by authorities to manage such situations are close or equal to 1 mSv/year, corresponding to the desire to progressively reduce long-term exposure to levels that are close or similar to situations considered ‘normal’, i.e within the band of constraints set for public exposure in planned situations.
References
ICRP, 2000. Protection of the public in situations of prolonged exposure. ICRP Publication 82. Ann. ICRP 29 (1–2).
ICRP, 2007. The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. ICRP Publication 103. Ann. ICRP 37 (2–4).
ICRP, 2009. Application of the Commission's Recommendations to the Protection of People Living in Long-term Contaminated Areas After a Nuclear Accident or a Radiation Emergency. ICRP Publication 111. Ann. ICRP 39 (3).
Authors on behalf of ICRP
J. Lochard, I. Bogdevitch, E. Gallego, P. Hedemann-Jensen, A. McEwan, A. Nisbet, A. Oudiz, T. Schneider, P. Strand, Z. Carr, A. Janssens, T. Lazo
Abstract - In this report, the Commission provides guidance for the protection of people living in long-term contaminated areas resulting from either a nuclear accident or a radiation emergency. The report considers the effects of such events on the affected population. This includes the pathways of human exposure, the types of exposed populations, and the characteristics of exposures. Although the focus is on radiation protection considerations, the report also recognises the complexity of post-accident situations, which cannot be managed without addressing all the affected domains of daily life, i.e. environmental, health, economic, social, psychological, cultural, ethical, political, etc. The report explains how the 2007 Recommendations apply to this type of existing exposure situation, including consideration of the justification and optimisation of protection strategies, and the introduction and application of a reference level to drive the optimisation process. The report also considers practical aspects of the implementation of protection strategies, both by authorities and the affected population. It emphasises the effectiveness of directly involving the affected population and local professionals in the management of the situation, and the responsibility of authorities at both national and local levels to create the conditions and provide the means favouring the involvement and empowerment of the population. The role of radiation monitoring, health surveillance, and the management of contaminated foodstuffs and other commodities is described in this perspective. The Annex summarises past experience of long term contaminated areas resulting from radiation emergencies and nuclear accidents, including radiological criteria followed in carrying out remediation measures.
© 2009 ICRP Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Post-accident; Rehabilitation; Optimisation; Reference level; Stakeholder involvement; Radiation monitoring; Health surveillance; Contaminated foodstuffs.
Key Points: Not included in this publication
Executive Summary
(a) The present report provides guidance on the application of the Commission’s Recommendations for the protection of people living in long-term contaminated areas resulting from either a nuclear accident or a radiation emergency. This post accident rehabilitation situation is considered by the Commission as an ‘existing exposure situation’.
(b) The following recommendations are the first to deal with the management of existing exposure situations since publication of the 2007 Recommendations (ICRP, 2007). They complement those made in Publication 82 (ICRP, 2000), and further develop the role of stakeholders, introduced for the first time by the Commission in this publication. They also take into account the evolution introduced by the 2007 Recommendations from the previous process-based approach of practices and interventions to an approach based on the characteristics of radiation exposure situations. They particularly emphasise the new approach of the Commission, which reinforces the principle of optimisation of protection to be applied in a similar way to all exposure situations with restrictions on individual doses.
(c) Although developed for managing a specific category of existing exposure situation, many recommendations developed in this report are broadly applicable with the necessary adaptations to other existing exposure situations like, for example, radon in dwellings and workplaces, naturally occurring radioactive material, or contaminated sites resulting from past nuclear and industrial activities. This particularly concerns the use of reference levels to plan protection strategies, the role of self-help protective actions complementing the protective actions implemented by authorities, and the accompanying measures to inform the affected individuals.
(d) The transition from an emergency exposure situation to an existing exposure situation is characterised by a change in management, from strategies mainly driven by urgency, with potentially high levels of exposure and predominantly central decisions, to more decentralised strategies aiming to improve living conditions and reduce exposure to as low as reasonably achievable given the circumstances. The decision to allow people who wish to live in contaminated areas to do so is taken by the authorities, and this indicates the beginning of the post-accident rehabilitation phase. Implicit with this decision is the ability to provide people with protection against the potential health consequences of the radiation, and sustainable living conditions, including respectable lifestyles and livelihoods.
(e) Past experience of existing exposure situations resulting from a nuclear accident or a radiological emergency has revealed that all dimensions of the daily life of the inhabitants within the contaminated areas, as well as the social and economic activities, are affected. These are complex situations which cannot be managed with radiation protection considerations alone, and must address all relevant dimensions such as health, environmental, economic, social, psychological, cultural, ethical, political, etc.
(f) In most existing exposure situations affecting the living place of the population, the level of exposure is mainly driven by individual behaviour and is difficult to control at the source. This generally results in a very heterogeneous distribution of exposures, which call for an individual approach for control of the situation. As a consequence, the use of the ‘average individual’ is not appropriate for the management of exposure in a contaminated area.
(g) Living or working in contaminated areas is considered to represent an existing exposure situation. For such situations, the fundamental protection principles include the justification of implementing protection strategies, and the optimisation of the protection achieved by these strategies. Reference levels are used during the optimisation process to plan protection strategies that would result in estimated residual doses lower than these levels. Dose limits do not apply because existing exposure situations cannot be managed in an a priori fashion.
(h) Protection strategies are made up of a series of protective actions directed at the relevant exposure pathways. The justification and optimisation of protection strategies are an evolution from previous Recommendations, which were focused on justification and optimisation of individual protection measures.
(i) In the case of an existing exposure situation following an emergency exposure situation, justification applies initially to the fundamental decision to be taken by the authorities at the end of the emergency exposure situation to allow people to live permanently in long-term contaminated areas. Such a decision may be accompanied by the setting of a radiation protection criterion above which it is mandatory to relocate the population, and below which inhabitants are allowed to stay subject to certain conditions. Several areas may be defined with relevant conditions according to a graded approach. Secondly, the justification principle applies at the level of decision related to the definition of the protection strategies to be implemented to maintain and possibly improve the radiological situation resulting from the emergency phase.
(j) The responsibility for ensuring an overall benefit to society as well as to individuals when populations are allowed to stay in contaminated areas lies with governments or national authorities. Worldwide experience following nuclear and non-nuclear accidents shows that neither nations nor individuals are very willing to leave affected areas. In general, while authorities may require individuals to leave the affected areas for health reasons in case of excessive residual levels of exposure, wherever possible, they will aim to rehabilitate these areas to allow further human activities.
(k) The principle of optimisation of protection with a restriction on individual dose is central to the system of protection recommended by the Commission for existing exposure situations. Due to its judgemental nature, there is a strong need for transparency of the process. This transparency assumes that all relevant information is provided to the involved parties, and that the traceability of the decision-making process is documented properly, aiming for an informed decision.
(l) Protection strategies have to be prepared by authorities as part of national planning arrangements. These plans should take into account self-help protective actions, including the conditions to allow such actions to be undertaken by the inhabitants, and their results in terms of prospective dose reduction. Although it is difficult to ask the population to plan in advance for these actions, the Commission recommends authorities to involve key representative stakeholders to participate in the preparation of these plans.
(m) As in most cases in long-term contaminated areas, the level of exposure is driven by individual behaviour; the authorities should facilitate processes to allow inhabitants to define, optimise, and apply their own protective actions if required. A positive aspect is that individuals regain control of their own situation. However, self-help protective actions may be disturbing and their implementation supposes that affected individuals are fully aware of the situation and well informed. It is the government’s responsibility to provide good guidance and to provide the means to implement it. Hence the government, or the responsible authority, will need to constantly evaluate the effectiveness of the protection strategy in place, including protective actions carried out at local or individual levels, in order to provide adequate support on how to further improve the situation.
(n) The Commission recommends that reference levels, set in terms of individual annual effective residual dose (mSv/year), should be used in conjunction with the planning and implementation of the optimisation process for exposures in existing exposure situations. The objective is to implement optimised protection strategies, or a progressive range of such strategies, which aim to reduce individual doses below the reference level. During the planning stage, the optimisation process should result in estimated residual doses that are below the reference level. During implementation of the optimisation process, particular attention should be given to reduce individual exposures that may remain above the reference level. However, exposures below the reference level should not be ignored; they should also be assessed to ascertain whether protection is optimised or further protective actions are needed.
(o) The reference level for the optimisation of protection of people living in contaminated areas should be selected in the lower part of the 1–20 mSv/year band recommended in Publication 103 (ICRP, 2007) for the management of this category of exposure situations. Past experience has demonstrated that a typical value used for constraining the optimisation process in long-term post-accident situations is 1 mSv/year. National authorities may take into account the prevailing circumstances, and also take advantage of the timing of the overall rehabilitation programme to adopt intermediate reference levels to improve the situation progressively.
(p) Reference levels are used both prospectively, for planning of protection strategies (as well as, if necessary, defining derived reference levels for the implementation of some specific protective actions such as, for instance, trade of foodstuffs), and retrospectively as a benchmark for judging the effectiveness of implemented protection strategies.
(q) The fact that exposures have been reduced below the reference level is not a sufficient condition to discontinue protective actions as long as there is room to reduce exposures further in conformity with the optimisation process. The continuation of such actions would probably be a prime mechanism to maintain exposures close or similar to those in normal situations as recommended by the Commission.
(r) The management of an existing exposure situation following a nuclear accident or a radiological emergency relies on the implementation of a more or less complex rehabilitation programme coping with numerous dimensions (social, economic, health, environmental, etc.) according to the level of contamination and its space and time distribution. The implementation of protection strategies is a dynamic process which changes with the evolution of the radiological situation.
(s) It is the responsibility of the authorities, particularly at the regulatory level, to establish the conditions and to implement the means to allow effective engagement of the affected population in the protection strategies and more globally in the rehabilitation programme. Past experience of the management of contaminated areas has demonstrated that the involvement of local professionals and inhabitants in the implementation of protection strategies is important for sustainability of the rehabilitation programme. Mechanisms for engaging with stakeholders are driven by national and cultural characteristics, and should be adapted to the circumstances.
(t) The priority of protection strategies implemented by authorities is to protect people with the highest exposures, and in parallel to reduce all individual exposures associated with the event to as low as reasonably achievable. This implies assessment of the dose distribution, comparison of all doses with the reference level, and subsequent optimisation of protection. Typical strategies to be implemented by the authorities in a post-accident situation are clean-up of buildings, remediation of soils and vegetation, changes in animal husbandry, monitoring of the environment and produce, provision of clean foodstuffs, managing of waste (resulting from clean-up or from unmarketable contaminated goods), provision of information, guidance, instruction and equipment (e.g. for measurements), health surveillance, education of children, information for particular exposed groups and the public at large, etc. Experience has shown that the dissemination of a ‘practical radiological protection culture’ within all segments of the population, and especially within professionals in charge of the public health and education, is key to the success of protection strategies in the long term.
(u) Typical actions taken by the inhabitants in long-term contaminated areas, called ‘self-help protective actions’ by the Commission, are those aiming at the characterisation of their own radiological situation, notably their external and internal exposure. These mainly consist of monitoring the radiological quality of their direct environment (ambient dose rates in living areas and contamination of foodstuffs), their own external and internal exposure, and the exposure of the people for whom they have responsibility (e.g. children, elderly), and in adapting their way of life accordingly to reduce their exposure. Authorities should facilitate the setting-up of local forums involving representatives of the affected population and relevant experts (e.g. health, radiation protection, agriculture authorities, etc.). These forums will allow gathering and sharing of information, and favour common assessment of the effectiveness of strategies driven by the populations and the authorities.
(v) In recent years, stakeholder engagement has moved steadily to the forefront of policy decisions. Such engagement is considered by the Commission as key to the development and implementation of radiological protection strategies for most existing exposure situations. The control of radon in dwellings is another typical example. As experience in stakeholder engagement has grown, it has been possible to use many of the lessons learned as a basis for the development of best practice among the radiation protection community. Processes and tools are becoming established that can be generally applied to situations where the views and input of stakeholders are instrumental in improving the quality of protection.
(w) In the case of an existing exposure situation, the Commission recommends that the individuals concerned should receive general information on the exposure situation and the means of reducing their doses. In situations where individual lifestyles are key drivers of the exposure, individual monitoring is an important requirement, coupled with an information programme. Furthermore, given the uncertainties concerning future potential health effects of the exposures received by the population since the emergency phase, it is the responsibility of the authorities to implement a radiation and health surveillance programme.
(x) From the perspective of assessing the evolution of the exposure situation and the effectiveness of the protection strategies, the Commission recommends that a monitoring record system should be established under the responsibility of the relevant authorities. Such records are particularly important for determining potential groups at risk, in conjunction with health surveillance. Furthermore, to allow effective long-term health surveillance of the affected population, the Commission also recommends that health registries should be established for the population residing in the contaminated areas.
(y) The management of contaminated foodstuffs and other commodities produced in areas affected by a nuclear accident or a radiation emergency presents a particularly difficult problem because of issues of market acceptance: Furthermore, maintaining long-term restrictions on the production and consumption of foodstuffs may affect the sustainable development of the contaminated areas, and therefore call for appropriate implementation of the optimisation principle. Reconciling the interests of local farmers, producers, and the local population with those of consumers and the food distribution sector from outside the contaminated territory has to be considered carefully.
(z) The Commission considers that, despite the socio-economic complexity of the management of contaminated foodstuffs, in view of the interests of different stakeholders, protection strategies should be developed to meet the established reference level and optimised at all levels where it is possible to intervene: production, distribution, processing, as well as measures taken for informing consumers and allowing them to make appropriate choices. Derived reference levels expressed in Bq/kg or Bq/L play an important role in this process, in particular for the placing of foodstuffs on the market.
(aa) Commodities other than foodstuffs may be contaminated following a nuclear accident or other radiological emergency. These could include agricultural products such as wood, paper, and oil, or other products recycled from contaminated materials such as scrap metal. The objective again is to reduce exposure to as low as reasonably achievable, taking into account social and economic factors.
(bb) Past experience of long-term contaminated areas resulting from either nuclear tests (Bikini, Maralinga), nuclear accidents (Kyshtym, Palomares, Chernobyl), or a radiological source accident (Goiânia) illustrates the potential importance of ingestion of contaminated foodstuffs several decades after the event at the source of the problems when large rural areas are affected. Management of these foodstuffs to protect the local population against chronic internal exposure and to maintain the viability of local productions is essential. When urban and semi-urban environments are affected, irradiation and inhalation may remain significant exposure pathways for a long period of time. As far as the setting of reference levels for existing exposure situations resulting from nuclear accidents and radiation emergencies is concerned, past experience shows that typical dose values selected by authorities to manage such situations are close or equal to 1 mSv/year, corresponding to the desire to progressively reduce long-term exposure to levels that are close or similar to situations considered ‘normal’, i.e within the band of constraints set for public exposure in planned situations.
References
ICRP, 2000. Protection of the public in situations of prolonged exposure. ICRP Publication 82. Ann. ICRP 29 (1–2).
ICRP, 2007. The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. ICRP Publication 103. Ann. ICRP 37 (2–4).
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